



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

was in fact a possible cause of the damage. It has not therefore yet been held that breach of a condition precedent avoids the express limitations of liability, when the damage would have occurred if the condition had not been broken.

**CHATTEL MORTGAGES — AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY — RIGHT TO OFF-SPRING OF MORTGAGED ANIMALS.** — The plaintiff claimed that a chattel mortgage of certain cows included the calves in gestation at the time the mortgage was executed, there being no reference in the mortgage to the increase. *Held*, that the mortgage gives only a lien, which does not attach to the calves. *Demers v. Graham*, 93 Pac. 268 (Mont.).

The general rule is that a chattel mortgagee has title, and so a mortgage on animals covers the increase, though not mentioned in the mortgage, on the principle *partus sequitur ventrem*. See 16 HARV. L. REV. 442. This rule weakens the effect of the recording laws, since an examination of the mortgage gives no actual notice of its extent. But in the few states where by statute or decision a chattel mortgage gives only a lien, it is often possible to change a result based on the mortgagee's title. Thus, contrary to the result in states passing title to the mortgagee, a tender of the amount due on a note, though made after maturity, discharges the lien on the chattel mortgage security. *Moore v. Norman*, 43 Minn. 428; cf. *Noyes v. Wyckoff*, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 466. So too the court is free to construe the lien as limited to the property actually described. The contrary view is a possible construction. *First Nat'l Bank v. Western Mtge., etc., Co.*, 86 Tex. 636. Thus a pledge is said to cover the increase. See JONES, PLEDGES, § 32. The view of the present case, however, is preferable, as it carries out the spirit of the registry laws. *Shoobert v. De Motta*, 112 Cal. 215.

**CONFLICT OF LAWS — LEGITIMACY AND ADOPTION — LEGITIMATION SUBSEQUENT TO BIRTH.** — A New York man deserted his wife and purported to marry a New Jersey woman, who bore him two children. Thereafter he became domiciled with his family in Michigan, obtained a divorce there from his New York wife by default without personal service, and went through a second marriage ceremony with the New Jersey woman. This divorce and remarriage a New York court by decree refused to recognize. By Michigan law illegitimate children become legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents. The children claimed New York realty under a devise as the "lawful issue" of their father. *Held*, that they are not entitled to the property. *Olmsted v. Olmsted*, 100 N. Y. 458.

For a criticism of this case in the lower court, see 20 HARV. L. REV. 400.

**CONSIDERATION — THEORIES OF CONSIDERATION — ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY PART PAYMENT.** — The plaintiff in a suit for the balance of a note admitted that several partial payments had been made by the defendant. It was inferable that the defendant was insolvent when the last partial payment was made, and possible that she had consented to the sale of certain land. *Held*, that it was error to charge that an agreement to accept the payments in full satisfaction is no defense. *Frye v. Hubbell*, 68 Atl. 325 (N. H.).

Although this case may not squarely involve the doctrine formerly established in New Hampshire that an accord and satisfaction by payment of less than the whole debt is not valid, yet it is certainly intended to annul that doctrine and does not rest on any exception to be made on account of the insolvency of the debtor. Reliance is placed upon the general reluctant expressions of assent to the overruled doctrine and upon the argument of Professor Ames that it is unjust and arose in England through a misunderstanding. See *Foakes v. Beer*, 9 App Cas. 605; 12 HARV. L. REV. 515; 13 ibid. 29. The various views of the nature of consideration are discussed in 8 HARV. L. REV. 27; 14 ibid. 496; 17 ibid. 71.

**CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — CLASS LEGISLATION — ACT ALLOWING PRIVATE CLAIM AGAINST STATE.** — Article III, § 19, of the Constitution of New York provides that the legislature shall not "allow any private claim against the